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COMPETITOR'S TRADEMARKS Is NOT
INFRINGING "USE IN COMMERCE"
OF THE MARKS
Leanne Stendell
N the recent case U-Haul International, Inc. v. When U.com, Inc., the
Eastern District of Virginia held that pop-up advertisements that ob-
scured the website of a competing product did not infringe on the
website owner's trademarks.' In reaching this decision, the court de-
parted from previous developments in the law of the Internet with regard
to trademarks. Additionally, the court permitted blatant usage of trade-
marks for advertising competing services, in direct contravention of the
purposes of trademark protection, leaving a trademark holder unpro-
tected from opportunistic use of its consumer recognition and goodwill.
WhenU.com, Inc. ("WhenU.com") creates and distributes an Internet
advertising program called SaveNow. 2  Computer users typically
download SaveNow along with another program, often a screensaver of-
fered for free on the Internet. 3 After the user accepts a licensing agree-
ment, both the free program and SaveNow are installed.4 SaveNow
monitors the user's Internet activity, constantly comparing keywords in
its directory with the website addresses ("URLs") visited, terms entered
in search programs, and the underlying programming code ("HTML") of
webpages visited. 5 If any of these triggering phrases matches a SaveNow
keyword, the program generates a pop-up advertisement related to the
keyword.6 The pop-up ad appears in a separate window in front of the
Internet browser window the user is viewing.7 If the user clicks within the
pop-up window, the original browser window switches to the advertiser's
website. Conversely, the user can click the "close" button of the pop-up
1. 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 731 (E.D. Va. 2003).
2. Id. at 725.
3. Id. The entertainment program is "the lure that hooks the user into downloading
the bundled software." 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 477
n.19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
4. 1-800 Contacts, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 477 n.21.
5. Id. at 476.
6. U-Haul, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 726.
7. Id.
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window to return to the original website. 8 SaveNow's directory of
keywords included U-Haul International, Inc.'s ("U-Haul") trademark
"U-Haul" as well as its trademarked URL, "www.uhaul.com." 9 When a
computer user with the SaveNow program installed on his or her com-
puter visited U-Haul's website, the SaveNow program generated a pop-
up for a U-Haul competitor that appeared in front of U-Haul's website. 10
U-Haul sued WhenU.com alleging trademark infringement, unfair
competition, trademark dilution, copyright infringement, contributory
copyright infringement, misappropriation, interference with prospective
business advantage, unjust enrichment, and other violations of Virginia
state law. I" U-Haul later amended the complaint to add another defen-
dant, an alleged agent of WhenU.com.12 Both U-Haul and WhenU.com
filed motions for summary judgment. U-Haul then filed a motion to va-
cate the trial date and to have the matter resolved solely on the basis of
the parties' summary judgment motions.' 3 Regarding the trademark
claims, U-Haul argued that WhenU.com's use of U-Haul's trademark was
"use in commerce" sufficient to state a claim for infringement under the
Lanham Act because 1) WhenU.com's ads appear as part of a single vis-
ual presentation of U-Haul's website, 2) WhenU.com uses U-Haul's
trademarks "U-Haul" and "www.uhaul.com" in its directory of keywords
that trigger ads, and 3) the pop-up ads interfere with U-Haul customers'
use of its website. 14 The district court held that none of U-Haul's argu-
ments constituted "use in commerce," and therefore U-Haul could not
sustain a claim for trademark infringement. The court granted summary
judgment on all claims in favor of WhenU.com.15
Under the Lanham Act, trademark infringement is shown when the
defendant, without the trademark holder's consent, engages in "use in
commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a
registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution,
or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which
such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.' 6
"Use in commerce" occurs with respect to goods when the trademark is
"placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays
associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto or ... on the
documents associated with the goods or their sale."'1 7 "Use in commerce"
occurs with respect to services when the trademark is "used or displayed
in the sale or advertising of services and the services are rendered in com-
8. 1-800 Contacts, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 477.
9. U-Haul. 279 F. Supp. 2d at 728.
10. Id. at 726.
11. Id. at 726-27.
12. Id. at 726.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 727.
15. Id. at 729.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(a) (2000).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
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merce."' 8 The phrase encompasses a "sweeping reach" into all matters
within Congress's Commerce Clause powers, meaning that any activity
that Congress could legitimately reach under the Commerce Clause is
considered "use in commerce" for the purposes of the Lanham Act. 19
The court in U-Haul found that WhenU.com had not made "use in
commerce" of U-Haul's mark.20 First, the court found that the pop-up
ads and U-Haul's website did not form a "single visual presentation."
2 1
Because the pop-up window is "separate and distinct" from the website
window, a very common occurrence in the Windows operating environ-
ment, WhenU.com had not "used" U-Haul's mark.22 Second, the fact
that the pop-up ads appeared on the same screen as U-Haul's website did
not represent "use in commerce" because that is how the Windows sys-
tem operates. 23 The court indicated that this amounted to nothing more
than "comparative advertising" that is acceptable even if "use" is
established. 24
Next, the court held that WhenU.com's inclusion of U-Haul's trade-
marks in its directory of triggering terms was not "use in commerce."
The court relied partially on DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bloom, where the
defendant used 1-800-MERCEDES as his telephone number but publi-
cized it only by its numeric counterpart, 1-800-637-2333.25 Although the
defendant reaped the benefits from people who, mistakenly believing
that he was affiliated with Mercedes called him, because he did not adver-
tise it, he did not "use" the trademark.2 6 The other case that guided the
U-Haul court's decision was Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solu-
tions, Inc., in which the court held that the use of a trademark as a URL
did not amount to infringement when the website located at the URL had
no connection "with the sale, distribution or advertising of goods or ser-
vices."' 27 The U-Haul court focused on the Lockheed designation that "in
order to infringe ... [domain names] must be used to identify the source
of goods and services," which would require something more than a
"pure machine-linking function. '28 Because WhenU.com used U-Haul's
trademarks for such a "machine-linking function" and not for advertising
18. Id.
19. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 283, 287 (1952).
20. U-Haul, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 729.
21. Id. at 727.
22. Id. at 727-28. A court facing identical facts came to the same conclusion on this
point and described its rationale in greater detail. That court stated that users were not
misled into believing that the pop-ups were part of the holder's website because the pop-
ups appeared in a separate window that obscured part of the original site. The court felt it
was therefore clear to users that the pop-up ad came from a different source than the
website they were attempting to access. Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F.
Supp. 2d 734, 760 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
23. U-Haul, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 728.
24. Id.
25. 315 F.3d 932, 938 (8th Cir. 2003).
26. Id. at 938-39.
27. 985 F. Supp. 949, 957 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
28. U-Haul, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 728 (quoting Lockheed Martin, 985 F. Supp. at 956).
2005]
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U-Haul's marks, "use" did not occur.29
Additionally, the court found that there was no "use" arising from in-
terference with U-Haul's website because users are not diverted from U-
Haul's site when they visit www.uhaul.com or search for "U-Haul," and
because SaveNow interacts only with users' computers, not with U-Haul's
system. 30 U-Haul's website remains unaltered by the pop-up window,
which can be closed or otherwise manipulated by the user.3' Further-
more, the user is in control from the very beginning because they choose
whether or not to download and install the SaveNow program, which the
court likened to other user-installed programs that generate pop-up win-
dows, like new message notifications from e-mail programs.3 2 The court
did not find U-Haul's cited authority persuasive with respect to interfer-
ence, as the cases involved "cybersquatting" situations in which the URLs
of the defendants' websites consisted of the plaintiffs' trademarks. Users
would mistakenly go to those sites believing them to be the plaintiffs' and
were thereby "prevented or hindered" from accessing the trademark
holders' sites.33 Therefore, because the court found that U-Haul could
not establish that WhenU.com had used its trademarks in commerce,
summary judgment was granted in favor of WhenU.com on the trade-
mark claims.
In this decision, the Eastern District Court of Virginia erroneously ap-
plied the "use in commerce" requirement. Other courts have held that
"use" is established when a search engine uses a trademark to trigger
advertisements for companies that offer goods or services that are similar
to those of the trademark holder, where the ads are included on the
search engine's website along with the results of the search. 34 In the U-
Haul case, WhenU.com's inclusion of "U-Haul" and "www.uhaul.com" as
triggering terms in SaveNow's directory was "use in commerce" of the
marks. The principle is the same as in the search engine cases: SaveNow
uses the trademark to trigger an advertisement, and in so doing generates
income from advertisers who pay to have their ads displayed. 35 It makes
no difference that the search engine's ads appeared on its own site while
WhenU.com's advertisements appeared as pop-up windows; in both
cases, the trademark is "used ... in the sale or advertising of services."' 36
29. U-Haul, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 728.
30. Id. at 728-29.
31. Id. at 729.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 728-29 (discussing PETA v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2001), and
OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 186 (W.D.N.Y. 2000)).
34. Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 703-04 (E.D. Va.
2004) (advertisements generated as a result of a search using plaintiffs trademark is use of
trademark sufficient to state a claim for trademark infringement); see Brief of Plaintiff-
Appellee at 17, 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 2004 WL 546931 (2d Cir. Mar. 3,
2004) (Nos. 04-0026(L), 04-0446(CON)) (citing Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commu-
nications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2004)).
35. See Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1024; Gov't Employees, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 703-04.
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
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Furthermore, other courts have found that use is established when a
defendant uses the plaintiff's trademark as his Internet address because it
has the effect of discouraging users from accessing the plaintiff's true
website. 37 Including a hyperlink to a defendant's site that is adjacent to
the holder's trademark also constitutes use.38 Additionally, use of an-
other's trademark in the underlying code of a website, which may draw
visitors who search the Internet for the mark, is another example of "use"
that supports a cause for infringement. 39 Finally, when a trademark
holder's mark appears in a browser frame around another's content, the
court may find infringement. 40 In the latter case, the court emphasized
several important factors in its finding of use constituting infringement:
(1) computer users might not realize the inner frame was not part of the
original website containing the trademark; (2) the URL location dis-
played in the browser window continued to indicate the original website;
and (3) the user clicked on a link like all others on the original site to
access the new site in a frame. 41
Here, U-Haul can establish "use" because WhenU.com uses U-Haul's
trademarks to discourage users from visiting U-Haul's website. WhenU.
com's pop-up ads partially block U-Haul's website. If a user clicks in the
WhenU.com window, even accidentally, the window with U-Haul's web-
site navigates to the advertiser's site. As in the cases in which defendants
were cybersquatting, this use of U-Haul's trademark to generate ads that
divert users from U-Haul's site discourages users from accessing U-
Haul's site. 42 This is also analogous to the use of trademarks in a
webpage's underlying HTML, which may draw users away from the
trademark holder's site.43 Here, WhenU.com's use of U-Haul's trade-
marks in the underlying code of its advertising program generates pop-up
ads that, if users click on them, pull users away from U-Haul's website
and to the advertiser's site instead.
Finally, U-Haul can establish "use" because WhenU.com's pop-up ads
appear together with U-Haul's trademarks. "Use" is found when a
hyperlink is merely placed adjacent to the holder's trademark; WhenU.
com's large pop-up ads, complete with text and images, next to U-Haul's
37. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, No. 97-CIV.0629, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3338, at *15 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. Mar. 19, 1997); PETA v.
Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 2001).
38. Courtenay Communications Corp. v. Hall, 334 F.3d 210, 214 n.1 (2d Cir. 2003).
39. Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1065
(9th Cir. 1999); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers. Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 465-66 (7th Cir.
2000); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Asiafocus Int'l, Inc., No. CIV.A 97-734-A, 1998 WL 724000,
at *8 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 1998).
40. Hard Rock Cafe Int'l, Inc. v. Morton, No. 97CIV.9483(RPP), 1999 WL 717995, at
*26 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1999). Internet "frames" appear in the same browser window as
part of a "single visual presentation," but each frame may be part of an entirely different
webpage. Id. at *25.
41. Id. at *25.
42. See Planned Parenthood, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338, at *15; PETA, 263 F.3d at
366.
43. See Brookfield Communications, 174 F.3d at 1065; Eli Lilly, 233 F.3d at 465-66;
Playboy, 1998 WL 724000, at *8.
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trademark as it is encompassed within its website, represent a far more
egregious use.44 The presentation of the pop-up advertisement in con-
junction with U-Haul's website is therefore similar to the "framing" situa-
tion in Hard Rock Cafe.45 The important factors the Hard Rock Cafe
court emphasized are also implicated here: (1) computer users might not
realize that the pop-up advertisement was not produced by U-Haul's
website;4 6 (2) U-Haul's URL continued to be displayed in the browser
window as the location even after the pop-up window appeared; and (3)
the user did not need to engage in any special activity to reach the pop-up
window, which required even less action on their part than the Hard
Rock Cafe users who at least had to click on a link inside the webpage to
access the inner frame.4 7 This is not the type of situation that Hard Rock
Cafe contemplated, in which the "distinction between the two sources of
material appearing on the screen might be clear to the computer user," a
factor the U-Haul court found determinative, because in fact it is not
clear to the user that the pop-up was generated by any source other than
the U-Haul website. 48 In fact, in a 1-800 Contacts, Inc. survey conducted
for trial, sixty-eight percent of computer users who had SaveNow in-
stalled on their computers were unaware of that fact. 49 Contrary to what
the U-Haul court seems to indicate by its reference to e-mail notifications
that may obscure another window, it is not sheer coincidence that
WhenU.com's pop-up and U-Haul's website appear simultaneously to the
user. This is precisely the effect WhenU.com intended its pop-ups to
have, and as a result, WhenU.com has "used or displayed [U-Haul's
trademarks] in the sale or advertising of services." '50
Furthermore, the U-Haul court's findings in this case contribute to a
split of authority among the district courts. In a case brought by a differ-
ent plaintiff against WhenU.com, another district court determined that
WhenU.com had used the plaintiff's trademark in such a way as to consti-
tute infringement. 5t First, the court found that use had occurred because
WhenU.com's advertisements appeared along with the trademark
holder's website. Computer users accessed the holder's site or searched
for it based on the strength of the holder's mark and, as a result, the pop-
up ads that appeared "capitalized" on this. This is therefore "use in com-
merce" of the ads for the purpose of advertising the defendant's ser-
44. See Courtenay Communications, 334 F.3d at 214 n.I.
45. See Hard Rock Cafe, 1999 WL 717995, at *25.
46. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 8, 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 309
F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Nos. 04-0026(L), 04-0446(CON)) (plaintiff's survey of
Internet users showed that "60% believe that 'pop-up advertisements are placed on the
website on which they appear by the owners of that site' and 52% believe that *pop-up
advertisements have been pre-screened and approved by the website on which they
appear"').
47. See Hard Rock Cafe, 1999 WL 717995, at *25.
48. Id. at *26 n.16.
49. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 8, 1-800 Contacts (Nos. 04-0026(L), 04-0446(CON)).
50. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
51. 1-800 Contacts, [ic., 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 at 489.
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vices.52 Second, "use" was established by WhenU.com's inclusion of the
plaintiff's marks in its directory of terms for generating the ads.5 3 The I-
800 Contacts view is better aligned with one of trademark law's main
goals, protecting trademark holders from competitors who seek to benefit
from the trademark without expending time, money, and effort. 54
WhenU.com is clearly benefiting from U-Haul's goodwill and popularity,
and a finding that insulates their use of U-Haul's trademarks, particularly
given the intrusive nature of the pop-up ads that block U-Haul's website,
serves to controvert the very purpose of the Lanham Act.
Although the U-Haul court strived to ensure that legitimate uses of
another's trademark were not enjoined by an overly broad definition of
.'use in commerce," the court could nevertheless have recognized that
WhenU.com's overt usage of U-Haul's trademarks in the advertising of
its services constituted "use in commerce." By distinguishing between
cases where windows unintentionally appear inside a window containing
another's trademarks, and the situation here where the software deliber-
ately places the pop-up ad in conjunction with the trademark, such legiti-
mate uses would be left undisturbed. Instead, the U-Haul court came to
the unwarranted determination that use of trademarks within a program
to generate advertisements and the deliberate generation of pop-up win-
dows that piggyback on the goodwill of the trademark holder's website,
all for the purpose of advertising services, do not represent "use in com-




54. Neel Chatterjee and Connie E. Merriett, Pop-Up Advertising as "Use in Com-
merce'" Under the Lanhan Act: A Case Analysis, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGI
Ti-ci. L.J. 1113, 1129, 1131 (2004).
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